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Peter Lampe announced two goals for his magisterial From Paul to Valentinus. 
On the one hand, his study was focused on “the daily lives of the urban Roman 
Christians of the first two centuries, the realities of their social lives.” On the 
other, he was engaged with the question of “where—if at all—interrelations 
between situation and theology can be discovered.” In this way, Lampe sought to 
steer the discussion away from “superficial monocausalisms” that have been 
“produced by a one-sided social-historical interpretation or, occasionally, 
suggested by purely inner-theological, history-of-tradition analyses of texts.”1  
There has been no lack of proposals addressing “interrelations between 
situation and theology” in the study of the Johannine epistles. Yet, the question of 
how exactly theology and situation are interrelated is often inadequately 
addressed. In most analyses, theology determines situation. Theologies endorsed 
and rejected in the three Johannine epistles, especially in 1 John, are often 
regarded as defining the entire situation addressed in these texts.2  
I seek to argue here for a more nuanced approach toward the “interrelations 
between situation and theology” in the study of the Johannine epistles. For one 
————— 
1 Lampe (2003), 2. 
2 See, e.g., Wengst (1976), 9: “I sought to offer … as precise as possible an understanding 
of the situation to which the First John is written. This situation is above all defined by the 
opposition attacked in the epistle.” Wengst finds “the definitive point of difference” between the 
author of 1 John and his opponents “in christology” (15). 
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thing, we should not too readily impose a theological disagreement on the conflict 
between Diotrephes and the author of 3 John. There is enough evidence to suggest 
that the conflict had a “doctrinal” aspect, yet not in the sense of “doctrine” as 
“theological truth”, but only in the weaker sense  that the author and Diotrephes 
had different opinions. There is no clear evidence that they disagreed on God, 
Christ or other divine beings.  
In the latter part of this essay, I explore how the author of 1 John uses God-
talk to construct a shared identity with the group he is writing to. I use as my point 
of departure recent studies in social psychology about leaders as “entrepreneurs of 
identity,” which emphasize the active role that leaders play in forging social 
identities in and for their respective groups. My discussion will be focused on how 
the author of 1 John employs the notion of divine begetting for this effect and how 
his usage of it can be better understood in light of Philo, who also frequently 




The three Johannine epistles are regularly explained as the result of theological 
controversies that broke the Johannine “community” asunder. This approach takes 
for granted that the group of addressees to whom the Johannine epistles were 
————— 
3 I wish to acknowledge here my debt to Dr. Sami Yli-Karjanmaa, who generously shared 
with me his expertise on Philo’s views about divine birth and begetting. 
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written was engaged in the same controversy and equally passionate about 
theology as the authors of these texts. This line of thought has also led to an 
endless guesswork about the opponents’ viewpoints, which are allegedly quoted 
or referred to in these epistles. Opposing positions have customarily been detected 
in the claims that the author of 1 John rebuts (e.g., “if we say that we do not have 
sin,” 1:8; “if we say that we have not sinned,” 1:10),4 as well as statements that 
point to a discrepancy between what is said and what is done (“if we say that we 
have fellowship with him, and yet walk in darkness,” 1:6; “one who says ‘I’ve 
known him,’ and yet does not follow his commandments,” 2:4; “one who claims 
to be in light, and yet hates the brother,” 2:9).  
The assumption that the author is quoting his opponents’ slogans has 
resulted in scholarly portrayals of the latter as considering themselves spiritually 
superior to others and, accordingly, showing little interest in the well-being of 
their fellow Christians (cf. 1 John 3:17, which is often read as a polemic against 
the author’s “spiritualized” opponents). The link between this picture and the one 
painted in hostile sources of the second-century Valentinian Christians, whose 
claims to spiritual insight allegedly made them both arrogant and morally 
indifferent, has not gone unnoticed among scholars of the Johannine epistles.5 
Though this point is clearly documented only rarely, I presume it is this similarity 
between the scholarly construct of the opponents of 1 John and the heresiological 
————— 
4 See, e.g., Brown (2006 [1982]), 762–763; Dodd (1946), 18; Painter (2002), 90–91; 
Smalley (1991), xxvi; Trumbower (1992), 137.  
5 The portrayal of Valentinians in hostile sources written by early heresy hunters should not 
be taken as a given, of course, but critically qualified in light of and as an example of ancient 
vituperation; see Dunderberg (2008), esp. 134–158. 
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construct of the Valentinians that underlies the usual opinion that the opponents of 
1 John were either “Gnostics” or “proto-Gnostics” on their way to full-blown 
“Gnosticism.” 
In more recent scholarship, the opponent-centered interpretation of the 
Johannine epistles has become subject to critical scrutiny.6 For instance, Judith 
Lieu has maintained that statements about the discrepancy between words and 
action in 1 John do not have to be based on anything the opponents said. The 
author nowhere accuses the opponents of being guilty of that discrepancy (or any 
other moral errors). Rather, such formulations are the author’s own way to drive 
home the point he wants to make.7 The opponents’ doctrinal profile becomes even 
dimmer if we agree with Lieu that the disagreement between the author of 1 John 
and his opponents was not about the incarnation of Jesus. In 1 John 4:2, 
incarnation is mentioned but not given as the object of right confession,8 and it is 
not mentioned in other related passages where the author speaks about denying 
and confessing Jesus (2:22; 4:3, 15). In the latter, the author does not portray his 




6 For a comprehensive review of scholarly theories about the opponents in 1 John, see 
Streett (2011). 
7 Lieu (2008), 10–12. 
8 See Lieu (2008), 166–167. Lieu points out that the formulation in 1 John 4:2 should not 
be understood as acknowledging “that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh”; the point is that “the 
true spirit acknowledges ‘Jesus Christ having come in the flesh’ or ‘Jesus Christ as having come in 
the flesh.’” Hence, the focus is on belief in Jesus, not on belief in his incarnation.  
9 See Lieu (2008), 167: “if Jesus Christ is not known and confessed as the one who has 
come, then he is not known at all.” 
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Community and Entrepreneurs of Identity 
  
The purported scenario that the author of 1 John was writing to a community split 
by theological controversy is more problematic than it may look at first blush. 
Stanley Stowers has recently pointed out how much intellectual baggage comes 
with the concept of “community” that is popular in early Christian studies. One 
key problem is that it creates the image of a group that is of a special kind—one 
“with a deep social and mental coherence, a commonality in mind and practice.”10 
As Stowers delineates, the use of “community” carries the implication that all 
members of a group were equally committed to the convictions proclaimed in our 
sources. In reality, it is impossible for us to know how deeply committed to those 
beliefs individual members of groups of early followers of Jesus may have been. 
It cannot be taken for granted that all, or even most, members of any such group 
were actively engaged in controversies about right theology and practice. It is 
more likely that such controversies were waged by only a few experts in theology, 
possibly including visiting ones (cf. 2 Cor 11:4–5; Gal 2:4). 
Nevertheless, the social impact of the authors of our sources should not be 
underestimated either. While we cannot infer from the texts that they wrote what 
their addressees believed, these experts on matters we consider religious—such as 
opinions about the divine and cults—were in a constant dialogue with their 
audiences, seeking to persuade them toward the right course of action and 
————— 
10 Stowers (2011), esp. 242. 
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dissuade them from wrong ones.11 While it is possible that some early followers of 
Jesus were completely indifferent to why they belonged to a certain group, group 
membership usually matters and is subject to reflection by individuals and 
collectively.  
The discussion about the social impact of the authors of our sources may 
benefit from the concept of “entrepreneurs of identity,” which theorists of social 
identity theory have coined in their studies about leadership.12 This idea notes that 
leaders are actively at work in crafting a “sense of us” for the groups they belong 
to. This does not have to mean that all members equally share or actively reflect 
on the leader’s vision of the group identity. Nevertheless, it would also be a 
mistake to assume that people are indifferent about the groups they belong to. 
Membership matters to, and is subject to reflection by, group members: “social 
identities are immensely important to individual group members. They give us a 
sense of place in the world: who we are, what we should do, and how we relate to 
others.”13 Such issues matter, since group membership involves “a process of self-
stereotyping: that is, people ascertain the terms of the group definition … and then 
seek to conform those norms.”14  
And yet, the “sense of us” that is of pivotal importance for the group does 
not simply evolve; it must be actively created. Hence, there is a demand for 
entrepreneurs of identity “to work to create and maintain a coherent sense of ‘we’ 
————— 
11 For an account of religious experts in the Roman world that is both comprehensive and 
compelling, see Wendt (2016). 
12 For a precursor to this approach in New Testament studies, see Shkul (2009). 
13 Haslam, Reicher & Platow (2011), 144. 
14 Haslam, Reicher & Platow (2011), 143. 
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and ‘us’ and also to define what ‘us’ means (and does not mean) for followers.”15 
The “sense of us” within a group is, thus, always a constructed identity. Such 
constructions of identity come from leaders who actively forge the social identity 
in ways that best serve the goals they want to achieve with and through their 
respective groups. 
Theorists of identity entrepreneurship further point out that there is a 
“dialectic relationship between (a) leadership constrained by existing social 
identities and (b) leadership as creative of social identities.”16 Since their means of 
constructing group identity are constantly under critical scrutiny by their 
followers, leaders must be able to strike a delicate balance between “cultural 
knowledge and rhetorical skill.”17 A successful leader has the knack for using the 
shared pool of cultural knowledge (“tradition”) in a creative manner: “great 
leaders … don’t just repeat traditional stories of identity. They innovate. They 
draw on less well-known strands of group culture. They weave familiar strands 
into novel patterns. … Their genius is to make the new out of the elements of the 
old and thereby to present revolution as tradition.”18 
 
Identity Entrepreneurship in 1 John 
 
————— 
15 Steffens et al. (2014), 1004. 
16 Haslam & Reicher (2007), 127. 
17 Reicher, Haslam & Hopkins (2005), 561. 
18 Haslam, Reicher & Platow (2011), 149. 
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Identity entrepreneurship is well attested in the Johannine epistles, especially in 1 
John. Its self-designated purpose is to effect fellowship between the author and his 
addressees (1:3). Accordingly, the entire text functions as an attempt to forge a 
“sense of us” to bring together the author and the addressees. While the author 
distinguishes between the group of eyewitnesses of Jesus (to which he belongs) 
and the addressees—“us” and “you” (1:3, 5), respectively—he also constantly 
designates the addressees as being part of “us” and strictly differentiates them 
from other people. 
One important aspect of the author’s way of forging the “sense of us” is his 
construction of shared tradition, designated as the original teaching, which has 
been there “from the beginning” (ἀπ᾽ἀρχῆς, 1:1; 2:7, 24; 3:11; cf. 2 John 5). The 
author’s claim to the original teaching is so strong that it seemingly overrides the 
fact that his text is both situational and argumentative. While he is clearly 
addressing what he regards (or constructs) as a new situation—that is, the problem 
of false teachers—he presents everything that he says in the text as the original 
teaching, which has always been there: “what was from the beginning, what we 
have heard, what we have seen with our eyes, what we saw and our hands touched 
upon … we proclaim also to you that you would have fellowship with us” (1:1–3). 
The author’s unexpected affirmation that the addressees do not need anyone 
teaching them, due to the divine anointing they have received (2:27), serves the 
same purpose. Given that the author himself has taught—and in this text 
teaches—the addressees, the lesson here must be that the addressees need no other 
teaching than what they have received—and probably will continue to receive—
from the author.  
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Moreover, the author crafts the “sense of us” in terms of loyalty to (“abiding 
within”) “our” tradition: “As for you, what you heard from the beginning should 
abide within you. If what you heard from the beginning abides in you, also you 
will abide in the Father and the Son” (2:24). The author’s construction of shared 
tradition turns any competing teaching into a deviation from what is (and has 
always been) common to “us.” In effect, this strategy places anyone propagating 
or approving any other teaching outside of “us.” 
One obvious example of identity entrepreneurship based on “less well-
known strands of culture” is the resurgence of apocalyptic imagery in 1 John. It is 
commonly noted that apocalyptic rhetoric figures much more prominently in 1 
John than in John’s gospel (e.g., awareness of “the last hour” and the appearance 
of “antichrists,” 2:18; the expectation of Christ’s imminent second coming, 
2:28).19 This suggests that the author of 1 John was capable of “activating” this 
less well-known—and yet probably not completely unknown—aspect of shared 
tradition in crafting a social identity for his addressees. Such activation of the 
apocalyptic register not only lends a sense of urgency to the author’s teaching, it 
also entails a strict polarity between “us” (as “the children of God”) and “them” 
(as “the children of the Devil”), which serves the purpose of demarcation that the 




19 See, e.g., Hakola (2015), 75–76; Strecker (1986), 41.  
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Absence of God-talk in 3 John  
 
One striking feature in the three Johannine epistles is that while much is said 
about God in 1 John, the theme is conspicuously absent in 3 John. Academic 
interpreters of 3 John have often sought to explain the lack of theology in 3 John 
by attributing theological and/or ecclesial positions to Diotrephes, whose policy of 
exclusion is bitterly protested against in the few lines the author of 3 John writes 
to an otherwise unknown Gaius. 
Given how little information about Diotrephes is offered by the author of 3 
John, the common narrative of placing Diotrephes on the axis between orthodoxy 
and heresy seems bewildering. Was he the leader of a heretical faction, thus 
bearing witness to the success of heresy over orthodoxy in early Christianity (see 
Bauer)?20 Or was he instead an orthodox bishop exercising church discipline over 
and against the Johannine author of 3 John, who exemplified a less formal and 
Spirit-inspired vision of leadership and was inclined to gnostic views (see 
Käsemann)?21 Or was the author of 3 John in the end waging a campaign on 
people who were precisely like that—namely, those who “represented 
gnosticizing or spiritual tendencies contrary to the presbyter’s apocalyptic 
teaching about Christ” (see Strecker)?22 
————— 
20 Bauer (1971), 93–94. 
21 Käsemann (1951), 292–311. Vouga (1990, 11) also detects in 1 John a “gnostic self-
understanding” that “characterizes the (author’s) fellowship with his addressees.” 
22 Strecker (1996), 263. 
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What makes these squarely opposed theories about Diotrephes possible is 
the complete lack of evidence in 3 John about his views. The letter clearly shows 
that its author was unhappy with Diotrephes’ policy of not extending a welcome 
to the author’s couriers. In addition, the conflict was no doubt a real one. This 
much can be inferred from the fact that the author was forced to admit defeat in 
the situation. The text indicates that Diotrephes had won the upper hand in the 
assembly and had been able to mobilize other people against the author’s 
messengers (3 John 9–10). Ending up on the losing side was certainly a source of 
shame for the author, who sought in the epistle to restore his honor and 
authority23—and also secure the loyalty of the addressee Gaius, whom the author 
portrays as one of his spiritual children (3 John 4). 
Moreover, there was a doctrinal dimension to the debate between the author 
and Diotrephes. Although we are left in uncertainty as regards to what it 
concerned precisely, there must have been some reason why Diotrephes declined 
to offer hospitality to the author’s couriers. It seems that Diotrephes’ action was in 
one way or another related to the author’s teachings. The epistle suggests that 
Diotrephes’ unfriendly actions toward the author’s envoys ensued from 
“something” the author had written “to the assembly” (3 John 9). Given that 
Diotrephes began to urge other people to adopt the same policy of exclusion as he 
did toward the author’s couriers (3 John 10), he must have had serious qualms 
about “something” the author had written. 
————— 
23 See Malina (1986), 187.  
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This, however, is all we know about the debate between the author and 
Diotrephes. The author neither attributes any particular ecclesial task to 
Diotrephes nor details what in his previous text had irked that person so much that 
he acted against the author’s envoys.  
While there is no way of knowing more about the disagreement, the debate 
was not necessarily about doctrine in the sense of “theological truth.”  In 
principle, it may have been on that kind of issue. We know of instructions offered 
to early Christ groups that they should only welcome visitors who demonstrated 
full compliance with the received teaching in those groups, and we know from 2 
John that this policy was also commended among Johannine followers of Jesus.24 
The problem with this explanation, however, is that the author of 3 John neither 
refers to any such tests of true faith nor announces any doctrinal disagreement 
with Diotrephes. He only accuses Diotrephes of moral errors, such as gossiping 
and lust for power. 
Another possibility is that Diotrephes was concerned about some other 
aspects than theology (in the sense of “God-talk”) in the author’s teaching. John 
Kloppenborg has recently pointed out that leaders of ancient associations could be 
concerned with anything that risked factionalism in their groups. Kloppenborg 
————— 
24 “If someone comes to you and does not subscribe to this teaching (διδαχή), do not take 
this person to your home nor greet him” (2 John 10). “And so, welcome anyone who comes and 
teaches you everything mentioned above (ταῦτα πάντα τὰ προειρημένα). But if the teacher should 
himself turn away and teach something different (διδάσκῃ ἄλλην διδαχήν), do not listen to him. 
But if his teaching brings righteousness and the knowledge of the Lord, then welcome him as the 
Lord” (Didache 11:1–2, transl. Ehrman). Neither text details how an “entrance exam” of this kind 
could have been conducted in practice. Unless members of the respective groups had checklists at 
hand, which they could resort to upon a visitor’s arrival, one would assume that the visitor’s wrong 
views would arise and be dealt with gradually rather than immediately when they came. 
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compellingly suggests that the Johannine love commandment, which was 
confined to insiders and thus entailed a strict division between “us” and “them” 
(cf. John 15:12; 1 John 2:10; 3:11; 4:7), could have easily been regarded in this 
way.25 While Kloppenborg uses this perspective to explain the references to the 
expulsion from the synagogue in John’s gospel (John 9:22, 34; 12:42; 16:2), it 
could also very well apply to the situation addressed in 3 John. Diotrephes may 
have been concerned about factionalism within his group. For this reason, he may 
have been more willing than the author of 3 John to accept the idea of corpus 
mixtum, in which the distinction between true and false believers was less sharply 
pronounced than the author of 3 John would have preferred.26 We do not have any 
definite information about Diotrephes’ thoughts or motives, but this explanation 
has the advantage that it offers a solution that is firmly rooted in the reality of 
ancient voluntary organizations and the challenges that their leaders faced.27 In 
any case, Diotrephes’ policy of exclusion was probably not based upon any clear-
cut theological disagreements with the author of 3 John (since the author does not 
mention any). This makes more likely the possibility that Diotrephes intervened 
————— 
25 Kloppenborg (2011). 
26 For one parallel to this attitude, see Matthew 13:24–29, where it is affirmed that the 
division between the two sets of believers only becomes visible in the final judgement. 
27 In another study, Kloppenborg delineates the ways the associations mimicked the 
administrative structures and policies of the city. Here he points out that Shepherd of Hermas 
(Sim. 1.1–3.6) provides us with an account referring to the expulsion from the city; see 
Kloppenborg (2017), 49–53. It is notable that the language of expulsion used in 3 John coincides 
with that in Hermas; both texts use the verb ἐκβάλλειν (“to throw out”), which is otherwise 
unusual in New Testament texts. This may suggest that the author of 3 John describes the 
expulsion of his people in terms that were customarily used in Greco-Roman associations. The 
verb ἐκβάλλειν also recurs in a number of association inscriptions referred to in Kloppenborg 
(2011); see 11: IG II2 1396.40–44 and IG II2 1339.136–46, with the latter describing an officer’s 
duty “to expel those who fight”. 
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because of the potential or real consequences of that author’s teachings on the 
social life of the assembly. 
 
Divine Origin and Knowledge about God in 1 John 
 
While God-talk is entirely absent in 3 John, it looms large in 1 John. The term 
“God” (θεός) occurs in 1 John more frequently than in any other New Testament 
text.28 This epistle appears “theocentric” in comparison to John’s gospel, which is 
more “christocentric”: some designations connected with Jesus in John’s gospel 
are used for God in 1 John.29  
Forging the “sense of us” characterizes the God-talk in 1 John. Most 
affirmations about God in this text are linked with ones about “us.” Above all, 
language of origins, family, and kinship figures prominently in the author’s God-
talk, and these features are constantly intermingled with each other. The author 
portrays the audience as belonging to a divine family: “we are called the children 
of God, and that is what we are … we are now beloved children of God” (3:1). 
The author affirms in a variety of ways that, as children of God, the addressees 
have their origin in God. Not only are they “from God” (4:4, 6; 5:18), but they are 
————— 
28 On the basis of the statistics provided by Accordance XII software, the word θεός has 
28.93 hits per 1000 words in 1 John, while John’s gospel only features 5.30 hits. The only other 
texts in the New Testament featuring more than 20 hits per 1000 words for θεός are Romans 
(21.50), 1 Thessalonians (24.24), 2 Thessalonians (21.79), and 1 Peter (23.17). 
29 See Hakola (2015), 75. One prominent example is Jesus as “light” (John 1:4–5, 9; 3:19; 
8:12; 9:5; 12:35–36, 46) and God as “light” (1 John 1:5). 
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also “begotten from God” (3:9; 4:7; 5:18)—just like Jesus “is begotten from God” 
(5:1). The metaphor of conception finds a very concrete aspect in the affirmation 
that God’s seed (σπέρμα) resides in those “begotten from God” (3:9). The notion 
of the audience’s kinship with God is amplified with the polarity drawn between 
“the children of God” and “the children of the Devil” (3:8). The latter are also 
designated as those being “not from God” (3:8; 4:6)—just like the erroneous 
spirits not confessing Jesus “are not from God” (4:2).30 
The divine origin of God’s children entails knowledge about God (4:7). 
Τhere is no clear distinction between “being from God” and “knowing God,” 
since both designations can used interchangeably: “We are from God. One who 
knows God listens to us. One who is not from God does not listen to us” (4:6). 
While here one’s divine origin and knowledge about God are bluntly identified 
with the acceptance of “our” teaching (either that of the author or that of the ideal 
community), the author also links these features to the right course of action, 
which is always expected to be shown toward those belonging to “us” (as tokens 
of love among the “brothers,” 4:7–8; cf. 3:16–18; 4:11).  
While the rhetoric of divine origin in 1 John seems fixed and deterministic, 
it is accompanied with other kinds of statements that allow fluidity. The transition 
from death to life that the author presents as shared tradition implies a less fixed 
————— 
30 Trumbower (1992), 138, affirms that in 1 John, the expressions “birth from God,” “being 
from God,” and “children of God” “no longer denote fixed and determinative categories in 1 John, 
but rather they are used to designate the change which took place when the believer entered the 
community.” I would insist rather that these are indeed determinative and fixed categories—just 
like the opposite category of “those from the Devil.” The language of fixed origins, however, does 
not exclude the fluidity implied by the possibility of transition from one group to another (from 
“death” to “life”). 
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idea of identity than that of divine begetting: “we know (οἴδαμεν) that we have 
passed from death to life because we love the brothers” (3:14). The author also 
envisions a future transformation of “us,” which entails assimilation to God: “We 
are now beloved children of God, and yet it has not been revealed what becomes 
of us. We know that when he will appear, we will become just like him since we 
will see him as he truly is” (3:2).  
As Rudolf Bultmann rightly recognized in his New Testament Theology, the 
Johannine discourse implies that the believer’s origins are changed: “He can 
exchange his Whence, his origin, his essence.” The same goes also for the 
unbelievers (cf. John 8:23, 44). One’s origins are thus determined by one’s 
“decision between faith and un-faith.”31  
The notion that one’s origins are negotiable rather than fixed seems less 
surprising in light of Denise Buell’s insightful study on ethnic reasoning in 
antiquity and among early Christians. Buell points out that fixity and fluidity went 
hand in hand in ancient reasoning about “us”: 
Although ethnicity and race are concepts frequently constructed through appeals to 
fixity (essences, including lineages and “nature”), they can also be constructed 
through appeals to malleability. That is, definitions of ethnoracial membership can 
foreground “achievement” (not merely “ascription”). If seeking to portray ethnicity as 
attainable, one might stress the centrality of common purpose, common language or 
education (paideia), way of life, or religious practices. Even claims of fixity are 
subject to fluidity in practice. … Ancient definitions of ethnicity do not necessarily 
occupy one of the extreme ends of the ascribed/achieved (or fixed/fluid) spectrum I 
have mapped. Frequently, they exhibit some combination of appeal to both fixity and 
fluidity…32 
————— 
31 Bultmann (1955), 2.25. 
32 Buell (2005), 41. 
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Buell maintains that “genealogical appeals are important for ethnic reasoning … 
because they offer a central way of communicating a sense of ethnic/racial 
‘fixity,’ essence, and continuity.” She further points out how “followers of Christ 
regularly defined themselves as descendants of key figures such as Abraham 
(Paul, Justin, Pseudo-Clementine Recognitions), Seth (Gospel of the Egyptians, 
Apocryphon of John), Norea (Hypostasis of the Archons) as well as Jesus 
(Aristides’ Apology, Justin’s Dialogue with Trypho). In such texts, one’s future—
specifically one’s access to salvation—depends on membership in the correct 
descent group.”33 The Johannine self-definition of “us” as the offspring of God 
operates in the same manner. It simultaneously emphasizes the importance of 
one’s membership in the correct group and the “achieved” aspect inherent in that 
status, since it entails the expectation of right behavior being shown toward other 
members of the group. 
 
Philo and 1 John on Divine Begetting 
  
Bultmann correctly saw that in Johannine usage, the expressions “to be from” and 
“to be born from” “serve to characterize men and their conduct … and denote the 
individual’s essence which asserts itself in all his speaking and doing…”34 
However, Bultmann’s assumption that the language of divine birth in Johannine 
————— 
33 Buell (2005), 75–76. 
34 Bultmann (1955), 2.20. 
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texts presupposes a full-blown Gnostic myth, stripped of its cosmic aspects, seems 
unnecessary.35 The variety of ways in which Philo speaks of assimilation to God 
and divine begetting offers a closer point of comparison to the language of divine 
kinship used in 1 John. Admittedly, the goal of Philo’s reflections about these 
issues is very different from that of 1 John. Philo constantly develops viewpoints 
pertaining to the hierarchy and inner divisions of the soul, whereas “soul” is not 
mentioned in 1 John at all. In this sense, Philo stands much closer to the 
philosophical tradition than the author of 1 John. Yet, what is common to both 
authors is the intimate connection that they draw between ethical reasoning and 
the notion of divine birth. 
The notion of divine begetting (or divine birth) is rare in the Hebrew Bible.36 
In Deuteronomy 32:18, the entire nation of Israel is addressed as one that “forgot 
the God who gave birth to you.” In Psalm 2:7, the divine adoption of a new king 
is expressed in terms of begetting: “You are my son; today I have begotten you.” 
Followers of Christ attached this passage to Jesus (Hebr 1:5; 5:5; Acts 13:33; 
Luke 3:22 [D]). The notion of divine adoption inherent in the messianic 
interpretation of Psalm 2:7 is one viable option for how the author of 1 John may 
have conceived of the exchange of one’s origins, for although he never speaks of 
rebirth (cf. John 3), the transition from death to life he posits for true believers 
suggests that he understands divine begetting in terms of a new, spiritual birth. It 
————— 
35 Bultmann (1955), 2.20, opined that the expressions in the Johannine texts “to be from” 
and “to be born from” God “have lost the cosmological sense that they have in the Gnostic myth 
and denote to the individual’s essence which asserts itself in all his speaking and doing and 
determines the Whither of his way.”  
36 See Büchsel (1964), 668–669.  
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seems feasible that the new birth from God could also be expressed in terms of 
one’s new origins that stem from God. 
Unlike in the Hebrew Bible, the language of divine begetting looms large in 
Philo’s works. While he constantly designates God as the begetter of all things,37 
most of his reflections about divine begetting are focused on the mind (νοῦς) and 
the virtuous life of human beings. Philo designates the mind as a virgin begotten 
by God “when it dwells with virtuous reasoning … and impregnates it with 
thoughts of highest excellence” (Spec. 2:30). In principle, the entirety of 
humankind is God’s kin because of the faculty of logical reasoning bestowed on 
all humans (Opif. 74, 146). Nevertheless, for Philo, kinship with God most often 
expresses potentiality for an intimate relationship with the Creator. Only some 
people fully realize this potentiality. Divine kinship becomes real through 
consideration of “spiritual and divine natures,” which also brings about the right 
course of action (Opif. 144). 
Two items in Philo’s on this point bring him close to the viewpoints 
expounded in 1 John. First, Philo teaches that kinship with God is only possible 
with the help of the divine spirit. It is the divine spirit, which “had flowed” into 
one “in full current,” that enables a person to enjoy the bliss brought about by 
“being of near kin to the Ruler” (Opif. 144). Just like the author of 1 John, Philo 
also reckons with the existence of an opposite spirit, characterized by its “tyranny 
rife with lawlessness (παρανομία) and cruelty” (Her. 60). The second point that 
————— 
37 See, e.g., Mut. 29, 63; Dec. 1:209; Spec. 1:209, 329; 2:198, 261; 3:189; Somn. 2:178; Aet. 
1; Praem. 46; Virt. QG 2:34. 
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Philo and the author of 1 John have in common is the Platonic ideal of one’s 
assimilation to God (Plato, Theaetetus 176; cf. 1 John 3:2: “We will become like 
him”).38 In Philo, this goal is more clearly linked with the right course of action 
than it is in 1 John, for the spirit-possessed person aspires “in all his words and 
actions to please the Father and King, following him step by step in the highways 
cut out by virtues since only for souls who regard it as their goal to be fully 
conformed to God who begat them (τὴν πρὸς τὸν γεννήσαντα θεὸν ἐξομοίωσιν) is 
it lawful to draw nigh to him” (Opif. 144). 
Despite his insistence that God has begotten everything, including all of 
humankind, Philo also designates some specific groups of people as God-
begotten. The aspect of potentiality linked with divine begetting may explain the 
tension between the universal and the particular interpretations in Philo: only a 
few people realize their true nature as God-begotten, even though this nature 
resides in all humans.39 However that may be, Philo distinguishes one group as 
“God-begotten,” calling them “people of God” (θεοῦ … ἄνθρωποι). These 
persons are “priests and prophets,” who have completely detached themselves 
from the world. They have “refused to accept membership of the world” and 
“have risen wholly above the sphere of sense-perception” (Gig. 61).40 These God-
begotten persons are distinct from, and superior to, two other categories of people, 
————— 
38 For Philo’s appropriation of this notion in Plato, see Yli-Karjanmaa (2015), 86–87.  
39 See Spec. 1:332. Philo calls ungodly people “the children of a harlot” because such 
children do not know their father, just as ungodly people are ignorant of their true Father. This 
presupposes that these people are also God’s children but do not know it. 
40 For Philo, complete detachment from the world is also peculiar to the perfect mind: “the 
mind, which has been perfectly cleansed and purified, and which renounces all things pertaining to 
creation, is acquainted with the One, and knows but the One” (Plant. 64); see Yli-Karjanmaa 
(2015), 97.  
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which are: (1) “the earth-born,” yielding to “the pleasures of the body,” and (2) 
“the heaven-born,” who are “lovers of knowledge” (but, by implication, reluctant 
to completely cut their ties to the world as fully as the “people of God”?) (Gig. 
60). 
Although the language of divine begetting, here reserved only for one 
group, may sound fixed, the three categories are malleable in Philo. Philo 
interprets the change of Abram’s name to Abraham (Gen. 17:5) as denoting his 
transition from the middle class (“man of heaven” and “lover of learning”) to the 
superior class (“man of God”). The transition implies that it is possible to become 
“God-begotten”—that is, to receive a new origin—in the same way as 
presupposed in 1 John. 
For Philo, the transition from “a man of heaven” into “a man of God” also 
entails perfection, since Abraham’s entrance to the latter involves his becoming 
“blameless” in front of God (Gig. 62; cf. Gen. 17:1). The way Philo here 
emphasizes the virtuous lifestyle of those begotten by God, illustrated by the 
blameless Abraham, brings his teaching close to the affirmation in 1 John that 
those begotten from God “do not sin … and are not able to sin because they are 
begotten from God” (3:9; cf. 5:18).41 The attributes that Philo reserves for one 
special class of people (e.g., divine begetting, blamelessness) are thus used in 1 
John for the entire in-group. In other words, the author of 1 John forges a social 
————— 
41 Philo also bears witness to the same tension as found in 1 John (cf. 1:8–10) between the 
possibility of sinless life and the affirmation that all humans sin; cf. Deus 76: “there is no person 
who self-sustained has run the course of life from birth to death without stumbling, but in every 
case his footsteps have stopped through errors, some voluntary, some involuntary.” 
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identity by imposing on this group an ideal self, based upon features that in Philo 
are only ascribed to a chosen few. 
As was pointed out above, divine begetting and knowledge of God go hand 
in hand in 1 John. For Philo, “knowledge of the One” is one of the features 
distinguishing the special class of “the sons of God”; Philo thinks the affirmation 
of divine begetting in Deut. 34:18 refers to these people in the know. 
Unsurprisingly for Philo, knowledge of God becomes visible in virtuous behavior: 
“They hold moral beauty to be the only good, and become warriors against 
pleasure” (Conf. 145).  
The author of 1 John does not connect divine begetting as clearly as Philo to 
the struggle against emotions, but he also insists that “nothing in the world—the 
flesh’s desire, the eyes’ desire and arrogance brought about wealth—is from God” 
(2:16). Thus, the author of 1 John shares with Philo both the ideal of detachment 
from the world (“do not love the world nor anything in the world,” 2:15) and the 
ensuing notion that this detachment involves freedom from harmful emotions. 
Both Philo’s “pleasure” (ἡδονή) and 1 John’s “desire” (ἐπιθυμία) belong to the 
four “basic” emotions in Stoic analysis, and they seem to agree with one another 
(and with the Stoics) that the tyranny of emotions can be combatted—at least by 
some ideal persons (Philo) or by “us” (1 John). 
The metaphor of sowing appears frequently in connection with Philo’s 
references to divine begetting. God as the perfect Father sows and begets 
happiness in human souls (Leg. All. 3:219), while one’s propensity toward God 
involves reception of “the seed of understanding” (τὰ φρονησέως … σπέρματα, 
Post. 135). God’s activity as the sower and begetter of “honorable births” (τὰ 
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ἀστεῖα γεννήματα) lays the basis for, and results in, “fulfilment of the law”; 
furthermore, it makes humans “march in whatever direction God leads the way” 
(Migr. 143-43.) God’s sowing thus emphasizes humans’ potential ability to 
engage in right action. 
In Philo, “seed” stands for potentiality toward something: “And if some 
seed of recovery should appear in him … it should be cherished as we fan an 
ember with every care. For we may hope that the germ may grow and spread, and 
that thus humans may lead a better and more stable life” (Sacr. 123). Philo uses 
the language of a divine seed to emphasize that the source of virtue lies outside 
humans: “Virtue receives the divine seed from the Creator” (Cher. 46). Hence, 
souls prone to virtue can only “accept the seeds of impregnation that are showered 
on them from outside, and revere the Giver, and thus by honoring God they repel 
the love of self” (Congr. 130). One would be unable to live a virtuous life if God 
did not “send down the seeds from heaven to cause her [Sarah] to be pregnant, 
and if she would not give birth to Isaac, that is, happiness in its totality…” 
Happiness, however, does not follow from merely possessing virtue that God has 
planted in human beings. The divine seed provides humans with the ability to 
engage in a virtuous life, but this ability needs to be put into practice. What brings 
about happiness is the “exercise (χρῆσις) and enjoyment of virtue” (Det. 60). 
Divine impregnation fills one with “seeds of virtue (τῶν ἀρετῆς σπερμάτων),” 
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while the ensuing pregnancy results in the birth of “good actions (καλὰς πράξεις)” 
(Deus 137).42  
Hence, in Philo, the notions of the divine seed and impregnation bring 
together fixed (acquired) and fluid (achieved) aspects of one’s kinship with God. 
This notion combines the idea of God as the only source of virtue with one’s 
responsibility to put this innate, God-given ability into practice by living a 
virtuous life. The author of 1 John does not dwell on the concept of the divine 
seed in any such detail. In light of Philo’s reflections, however, it seems possible 
to assume that the divine seed in 1 John 3:9 denotes one’s ability to follow the 
right course of action. This would explain the affirmation that sinlessness results 
from one’s possession of the divine seed. At this point, the author of 1 John seems 
to negate the aspect of potentiality inherent in Philo’s understanding of the divine 
seed, since he boldly contends that it is impossible for those begotten by God to 
sin.43 This radical affirmation is balanced with other statements, however; he notes 
that all addressed group members sin and must confess those sins (1:8–10), and he 
describes sinlessness as a goal rather than a fact (2:1–2). 
Philo links the language of sowing with the masculine form of reproduction. 
Even Wisdom, who is “God’s daughter,” “is not only masculine but also father, 
————— 
42 See Draper (2017), 7: “God, as the unbegotten begetter, sows his divine seed (τὰ θεῖα 
σπέρματα) in human beings not to bring forth children for himself since he needs nothing (ἡ δὲ 
συλλαβοῦσα ἔτεκεν οὐ θεῷ – ἱκανὸς γὰρ μόνος καὶ αὐταρκέστατος ἑαυτῷ), but to bring forth 
virtue to human beings by the divine life within them.” 
43 van der Watt (1999), 496, explains this notion as emerging from ancient family ethics: 
“‘Being born of God’ is the reason why a child of God cannot sin. Identity—nothing like freedom 
of choice or a particular situation—basically determines the child's actions, both positively and 
negatively.” Accordingly, he links the claims about “us” still commiting sins with the problem of 
“disobedience in practice” that was often addressed in ancient philosophy as part of family issues 
(ibid. 497–497). 
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sowing and begetting in souls aptness to learn, discipline, knowledge, sound 
sense, good and laudable actions” (Fug. 50). Here again the author of 1 John may 
be close to Philo. Turid Karlsen Seim has pointed out that the Johannine language 
of reproduction is thoroughly masculine; it does not involve any female 
contribution:44 
  
In the Gospel of John … there is no female principle involved in the divine begetting 
and birth-giving. The mother does not matter because matter is what she provides. 
The only begotten God/Son who is in the κόλπος of the Father (John 1:18) bears the 
children of God, in whom the σπέρμα, that is, the πνεῦμα of God, abides. They are 
begotten as well as born not of bloods, not of the will of flesh or of the will of man, 
but of God, that is of Father and Son—one in their will and purpose and both with the 
exclusive quality of having life in themselves. 
  
The cooperation of two males in divine reproduction that John’s gospel 
presupposes is not really reflected upon in 1 John. Yet, the fact that the author of 
this text speaks of God’s seed demonstrates that the author thinks of divine 
————— 
44 Seim (2005), 375. While Seim maintains that John’s gospel presupposes the Aristotelic 
epigenesis but removes from it the female element, Rothschild (2010) suggests that John’s theory 
of reproduction stands closer to ancient theories about parthenogenesis (usually linked with 
plants). Rothchild concludes that “the Fourth Gospel may shift parthenogenesis from an 
explanation of Jesus’ biological birth (attested in Matthew and Luke) to an explanation of Jesus’ 
divine birth.” In addition, Rothschild argues that the way the divine birth of the believer is 
described in John 3:8 (stemming from pneuma as Spirit, compared to pneuma as wind) also recalls 
the notion of parthenogenesis: “to be born from above … is to allow the mixed male and female 
components of the “soul” (or human aspect susceptible to truth) to be carried like a seed on the 
wind to a natural landing place in which it can generate and grow” (137). This reading could be 
supported with references to Philo, who describes the divine begetting as opposed to the human 
one and in terms of virginity: “For the union of human beings that is made for the procreation of 
children turns virgins into women. But when God begins to consort with the soul, he makes what 
was before a woman into a virgin again” (Cher. 50). Philo also uses a vegetative analogy to 
describe how the divine seed within human beings needs to be nourished. He explains the name of 
Seth as denoting “watering” (Post. 10, 124, 170) and infers from this that the figure of Seth 
allegorically refers to the way in which “the word of God waters the virtues; for the word of God 
is the source and spring of noble conduct” (Post. 127). (This explanation seems erroneous since 
“Seth” in Hebrew means “reproduction” or “replacement”; cf. LVTL s.v.)  
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reproduction in terms of begetting rather than in terms of giving birth. Philo 
articulates this point in greater detail. In his view, divine birth is not only 
something extraordinary but it also lacks female contribution. For him, the 
Sabbath day was “motherless, exempt from female parentage,” and divine 
Wisdom, albeit being female, acts toward humans as the Father and begetter of 
the soul’s right inclination. For Philo, Sarah, who due to old age was no longer 
able to contribute the female element to her pregnancy, illustrates “the virtue … 
who is the motherless beginning (ἀμήτωρ ἀρχή), begotten of the Father alone, 




This essay developed a few viewpoints in response to Peter Lampe’s endeavor to 
study “interrelations between situation and theology.” To determine such 
interrelations can be quite complicated both theoretically—as Stanley Stowers’ 
critical review of the concept “community” as unified by faith and practice 
demonstrates—and exegetically. There is a strong tendency in our field to assume 
that all members of “communities of faith” were constantly preoccupied with 
issues pertaining to right doctrine and praxis. I am more inclined to the view that 
such issues were probably subject to debate first and foremost among religious 
experts who had sufficient knowledge and interest (and time) to wage battles of 
right interpretation. Such people, however, were of pivotal importance to their 
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respective groups as entrepreneurs of identity, who forged the “sense of us” for 
those groups. These specialists provided members of their groups with narratives 
of what brought their “us” together. The specialists’ constructions of social 
identity mattered (and continue to matter), since membership matters to group 
members. I also suggested that debates between early Christian specialists did not 
have to be about “theology” in the strict sense; they could also be about (potential 
or real) social consequences of one teaching or another. 
In the latter part of this essay, I explored the notions of divine begetting and 
divine seed, which the author of 1 John used to craft the “sense of us” for his 
audience. These notions are especially well suited for that purpose, since they 
simultaneously affirm the indicative (one’s divine origin) and the imperative (the 
ensuing ethical obligation to love other members of the community).45 As the 
comparison to Philo showed, the link in 1 John between one’s divine begetting 
and the right course of action is by no means unique. 
The comparison to Philo also raises another issue, which is the social 
standing of the author of 1 John. In my estimation, the analogies referred to above 
are close enough to suggest that the two authors shared some common ground. 
And yet there are differences. The author of 1 John was clearly less 
“philosophical” than Philo; most of the key terms and issues in Philo—such as 
————— 
45 This conclusion brings my reading close to van der Watt’s insightful study on ethics 
based on birth, family and kinship in 1 John; see van der Watt (2014), 207: “The effect of relating 
birth to behavior, with all expectations that went along with it (i.e., behave according to your 
social position of birth, obey your father, allow your identity determined by the group, etc.) is that 
a person lives within a framework of expected behavior based on his birth. The child is under an 
obligation to behave according to the will of the one from whom he or she was born.” 
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“virtue”, the inner structure of the soul, and moral progress—are absent in 1 John. 
What is more, as is often noted, the author of 1 John rarely, if ever, develops any 
advanced chains of argumentation. At the same time, the fact remains that both 
authors shared an interest in divine begetting, which plays a marginal role in the 
Hebrew Bible, and developed views about right behavior based on this notion. In 
my opinion, the affinity is close enough to suggest that the author of 1 John had 
some advanced knowledge about Hellenistic (Jewish?) philosophy, which he 
resorted to in crafting the “sense of us” for the addressees of his text. This being 
the case would justify our seeing in the author of 1 John a precursor to early 
Christian intellectuals. A glimpse of Platonic theology in the epistle—the 
expectation of “our” assimilation to God (3:2)—points in the same direction, as 
does the polemic against desire in 1 John 2:16.   
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